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Antitrust Policy and Interest-Group Politics
The application of this model which stresses that government intervention in the economy will always benefit some political groups at the expense of others to the analysis of antitrust enables Shughart both to identify important trends in the antitrust arena and demonstrate which groups have benefited most from antitrust legislation.
| Author(s) | By William F. Shughart. |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Bloomsbury Publishing Plc |
| Format | Hardback |
| Pages | 232 |
| Published in | United States |
| Published | 9 Apr 1990 |
| Availability | Not yet available |
The application of this model which stresses that government intervention in the economy will always benefit some political groups at the expense of others to the analysis of antitrust enables Shughart both to identify important trends in the antitrust arena and demonstrate which groups have benefited most from antitrust legislation.
Foreword Preface Introduction Normative and Positive Theories of Antitrust The Origins and Critique of Antitrust The Interest-Group Theory of Government Private Interests at Work Business Enterprise The Antitrust Bureauracy The Congress The Judi
WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II is Professor of Economics and holder of the P.M.B Self, William King Self, and Henry C. Self Chair in Free Enterprise at the University of Mississippi. He is a former special assistant to the director of the Federal Trade Commission
